<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Routes on Wirez</title><link>https://wirez.top/tags/routes/</link><description>Recent content in Routes on Wirez</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://wirez.top/tags/routes/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>RPKI stops hijacking: Why 43% IPv4 coverage matters</title><link>https://wirez.top/posts/rpki-stops-hijacking-why-43-ipv4-coverage-matters/</link><pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://wirez.top/posts/rpki-stops-hijacking-why-43-ipv4-coverage-matters/</guid><description>&lt;meta charset="utf-8">
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&lt;p class="std-text">With &lt;a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPv4" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">IPv4&lt;/a> ROA coverage hitting 43.17% per Kentik data, &lt;strong>RPKI adoption&lt;/strong> is no longer optional for serious network operators.&lt;/p>
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&lt;p class="std-text">The upcoming &lt;a href="https://www.arin.net/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">ARIN&lt;/a> Deep Dive in Albuquerque highlights that &lt;strong>routing security&lt;/strong> has shifted from theoretical best practice to immediate operational necessity. &lt;a href="https://www.arin.net/resources/manage/rpki/hybrid/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">ARIN&amp;#039;s hybrid&lt;/a> While the global PKI market explodes, the real story lies in the sharp divergence between networks that validate BGP announcements and those still vulnerable to hijacking. This article dissects the critical mechanics of &lt;strong>Resource Public Key Infrastructure&lt;/strong>, arguing that understanding the distinction between hosted and delegated models is now a core competency for any engineer managing autonomous systems.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>IPv6 loops explained: Stop packet amplification now</title><link>https://wirez.top/posts/ipv6-loops-explained-stop-packet-amplification-now/</link><pubDate>Thu, 26 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://wirez.top/posts/ipv6-loops-explained-stop-packet-amplification-now/</guid><description>&lt;meta charset="utf-8">
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&lt;p class="std-text">Routing loops can exponentially amplify traffic when routers duplicate packets, a flaw prevalent in 34% of assigned &lt;a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8200" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">IPv6&lt;/a> blocks.&lt;/p>
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&lt;p class="std-text">The core thesis is clear: the sparse population of &lt;strong>IPv6 address space&lt;/strong> combined with misconfigured &lt;strong>provider-aggregatable&lt;/strong> assignments creates a fertile ground for &lt;strong>packet amplification&lt;/strong> that network operators are lazily ignoring. While cloud-native workloads drive adoption, the underlying routing hygiene has not kept pace, leaving infrastructure vulnerable to self-inflicted &lt;strong>DDoS attacks&lt;/strong>. Research indicates that despite the simplicity of the fix, the community fails to prioritize these dangerous misconfigurations, allowing unnecessary load to congest links and destabilize the global internet.&lt;/p></description></item></channel></rss>