<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Scion on Wirez</title><link>https://wirez.top/tags/scion/</link><description>Recent content in Scion on Wirez</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://wirez.top/tags/scion/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>SCION routing fixes BGP's 40-year security gap</title><link>https://wirez.top/posts/scion-routing-fixes-bgps-40-year-security-gap/</link><pubDate>Tue, 17 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://wirez.top/posts/scion-routing-fixes-bgps-40-year-security-gap/</guid><description>&lt;meta charset="utf-8">
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&lt;p class="std-text">Over 7,000 route entries remained invalid in March 2020 despite decades of patch attempts. The Border Gateway Protocol fundamentally lacks native mechanisms to verify address ownership, rendering current fixes like RPKI insufficient against sophisticated &lt;strong>route hijacks&lt;/strong>. While extensions such as &lt;strong>BGPsec&lt;/strong> attempt to secure the AS_PATH attribute, they impose heavy computational overhead and fail to address the core architectural rot of a forty-year-old system.&lt;/p></description></item></channel></rss>