Autonomous system blocking: Why Europe's new plan risks

Autonomous System Number

European rights groups propose blocking entire networks via Autonomous System Number identifiers rather than individual sites.

Entities like beIN Sports, the Audiovisual Anti-Piracy Alliance, and Aylo are pressuring the Commission européenne to adopt ASN-level enforcement. Their logic is simple: pirates rotate domains and IP addresses faster than traditional filters can track. This strategic pivot targets the underlying hosting infrastructure of non-cooperative providers outside the European Union instead of chasing ephemeral URLs. The proposal relies on tagging specific network identifiers to create a public database that mandates traffic blocking across European technical intermediaries.

This approach shifts legal pressure from content links to the BGP blackholing and route filtering mechanisms that govern internet traffic flow. Telecom operators could be forced to sever connections to entire Autonomous System ranges based on their perceived lack of cooperation with copyright holders. We are looking at the technical reality of designating whole networks as hostile entities within the global routing table.

This escalation represents a fundamental change in how internet infrastructure is policed, moving beyond simple DNS blocking to wholesale network exclusion. The stakes involve not just pirate sites but the stability and neutrality of the routing protocols that connect billions of devices globally.

The Strategic Shift from DNS Blocking to ASN-Level Enforcement

Defining ASN and Autonomous Systems in Network Enforcement

An Autonomous System Number (ASN) serves as the unique public tag for a bundle of IP networks run by one administrative owner. This label separates substantial cloud providers and ISPs inside the global routing table. Stopping an ASN cuts off access across a whole network edge instead of hitting just one server. Such wide measures touch every service sitting inside that specific autonomous system, covering legitimate infrastructure used by unrelated tenants too.

Rights holders like beIN Sports and the Audiovisual Anti-Piracy Alliance (AAPA) claim this step is needed because pirate platforms swap domains and IP addresses quickly to dodge detection. They suggest flagging non-cooperative hosts by their ASN to curb traffic delivery to European users. Yet an ASN rarely carries only illegal content, so enforcement moves inevitably hit compliant services on the same network. This creates immediate friction between strong copyright enforcement and the stability of shared hosting setups. InterLIR notes that optimizing current IPv4 resources needs sharp targeting to skip unnecessary collateral harm. Moving from domain filtering to network-wide blackholing changes how operators handle BGP policies fundamentally. Operators now balance the legal duty to block specific identifiers against the technical truth of shared infrastructure links.

Implementing ASN-Level Blocking via BGP Blackholing

Tagging non-cooperative hosts by Sovereign System Number pushes European intermediaries to drop traffic for whole networks. Three groups, including beIN Sports, want a central authority to spot these entities, mainly those outside the Union. Once listed, technical middlemen must use BGP blackholing to push data packets into a void. Or route filtering rejects certain route announcements, while de-peering cuts interconnection completely.

This method differs sharply from DNS blocking, which only redirects domain queries rather than halting IP transport. The move aims straight at the infrastructure layer. Still, using such rough tools risks heavy collateral harm to legal services sharing the same ASN. Most operators lack fine controls to isolate bad subnets inside a larger autonomous system. The operational fact is that blocking an ASN often knocks out innocent tenants beside the intended mark. InterLIR pushes for optimizing existing IPv4 resources to ease such scarcity-driven clashes. Efficient allocation lowers the chance that legitimate firms share space with bad actors. Network stability rests on precise routing policies, not broad censorship orders. 🌐

DNS Blocking vs BGP Routing: Escalating from Domains to Infrastructure

Aiming at the Self-governing System Number moves enforcement from fleeting domain names to lasting network infrastructure. In the past, strategies focused on stopping specific domain names, DNS records, or single IP addresses tied to illegal content distribution. Substantial rights holders argue these tools fall short because pirate platforms change their domain, IP address, or server fast to escape detection. Unlike DNS blocking, which just redirects name resolution queries, BGP-level techniques act directly on IP routing paths.

Proposals urge tagging non-cooperative hosts by their ASN for mandatory blocking by European intermediaries. This approach uses BGP blackholing to send traffic to a null route or route filtering to reject path announcements fully. The operational fact is that blocking an ASN breaks access for an entire network edge managed by one entity. Since an autonomous system often hosts thousands of unrelated tenants, this method inevitably hits legitimate infrastructure sharing the same IP space. While strong against evasive targets, the technique swaps precision for breadth, creating real risk of overblocking services unrelated to piracy. InterLIR sees that while rights holders aim to neutralize "specialized" hosting networks, the technical mechanism cannot tell malicious from benign traffic once the ASN is flagged. The shift marks a basic change from policing content addresses to policing network connectivity itself.

Technical Mechanics of BGP Blackholing and Route Filtering

BGP Blackholing and Route Filtering Mechanics

Traffic vanishes into a BGP blackholing sinkhole when routers steer unwanted packets toward a null interface. This action deletes data flows instantly. Route filtering behaves differently by refusing to accept or share specific path announcements with peer networks. Complete disconnection happens through de-peering, which severs the physical or logical link between two autonomous systems. DNS blocking targets user requests at the application layer, whereas these BGP methods intercept traffic on the interdomain routing plane itselfa large numbers of independent networks exchange path data constantly, making such low-level controls incredibly potent yet dangerously blunt.

Network engineers apply these instruments to isolate malicious infrastructure during active cyber attacks. The Audiovisual Anti-Piracy Alliance (AAPA) now suggests repurposing them for copyright enforcement. Telecom operators already own the required tooling, according to the AAPA, pointing to BGP blackholing, route filtering, IP prefix blocking, and ASN de-peering as ready solutions. Stripping an entire autonomous system of its peers removes every possible path to every single customer inside that network. This reality creates immediate friction between targeted legal enforcement and the stability of global routing. Applying such nuclear options to content disputes jeopardizes the convergence properties keeping the internet reachable. An ASN never hosts only pirate sites, so blocking a whole network punishes legitimate services too. Over-blocking represents the fatal flaw in these proposals.

Enforcing Network Blocks via Prefix and ASN Filtering

Border routers enforce route filtering by rejecting specific IP prefix announcements or full ASN paths from upstream peers. This configuration stops traffic at the network edge before it consumes internal bandwidth, a distinct advantage over blackholing which absorbs the flow first. These techniques could prevent networks identified as massively hosting pirated content from reaching European internet users. Assigned "non-cooperative" hosts, primarily those located outside the European Union, would face blocking obligations imposed by European technical intermediaries.

Collateral damage occurs because blocking a single ASN affects every legitimate service sharing that network infrastructure. Proposals aim to block potentially an entire hosting network judged "specialized" in such activities. Technical execution remains straightforward. Operational risk involves disconnecting necessary services unrelated to piracy. No contribution details how to avoid this collateral damage, a silence noted by telecom operators. Absolute control over access trades directly against the potential for significant unintended outages.

Operational Risks of Misconfigured BGP Route Filters

Indiscriminate blocking of an ASN (Independent System Number) disconnects every legitimate service sharing that network infrastructure. Operators applying route filtering to enforce anti-piracy mandates risk creating widespread collateral damage if prefix lists lack granular precision. The BGP blackholing technique discards all packets destined for the targeted range. BeIN, the AAPA, and Aylo invoke proportionality and control by a competent authority. Lack of detail on avoiding collateral damage remains a primary concern.

Blocking a network entirely sanctions legitimate services alongside infringing ones. Optimizing existing address space reduces the density of bad actors. Broad infrastructure blocks remain a disproportionate response given the potential for widespread service disruption.

Operational Risks of Overblocking and Collateral Damage

The Proportionality Gap in ASN-Level Blocking Mandates

An Separate System Number identifies a network block that invariably hosts mixed legitimate and pirate traffic together. Rights holders like beIN, the AAPA, and Aylo argue for proportionality yet provide no technical method to isolate illegal content within these shared spaces. Blocking an entire ASN penalizes every customer on that infrastructure, creating immediate collateral damage for innocent businesses. The core controversy stems from this inability to surgically remove piracy without disrupting valid services. Network operators face hidden costs when mandated to filter broad prefixes. Revenue vanishes from legitimate tenants sharing the blocked infrastructure. Support teams drown in tickets from unaffected customers experiencing sudden outages.

Collateral Damage Scenarios for Time-Sensitive Content Owners

Blocking an entire Sovereign System Number disrupts every legitimate service sharing that IP prefix alongside pirate sites. Aylo, owner of Pornhub and Brazzers, estimates that premium adult content also constitutes "time-sensitive" works, whose value depends on immediate availability. This logic supports a European mechanism benefiting all rights holders, yet it ignores the technical reality that an ASN hosts mixed traffic. A BGP blackhole directive targeting a non-cooperative host inevitably silences valid businesses unable to migrate quickly. Overblocking creates hidden operational costs for network operators and their customers. Legitimate tenants lose revenue when sharing blocked infrastructure. Compliant services suffer reputational damage when vanishing without warning.

Telecom Operator Warnings on Undefined Collateral Damage Protocols

Telecom operators flag a critical silence from beIN, the AAPA, and Aylo regarding technical safeguards against overblocking. The Achilles' heel of these proposals remains the high risk of collateral damage when filtering entire networks. Since an ASN never hosts exclusively pirate sites, blocking an entire network amounts to sanctioning legitimate services as well. Rights holders invoke proportionality, yet no contribution details how to prevent these failures during implementation. This absence of protocol creates a dangerous vacuum where the lack of set mitigation strategies leaves operators unable to isolate illegal content without disrupting valid traffic. Specific hidden costs emerge from this undefined operational environment. Legitimate tenants sharing blocked IP prefixes suffer revenue loss. Customers unable to reach necessary services drive up support ticket volumes. ISPs forced to enforce blunt network instruments face severe reputational damage. Rights holders demand action but offer no mechanism to spare non-infringing users within a targeted Autonomous System.

Implementing KYBC Compliance and Hosting Provider Obligations

Know Your Business Customer Obligations for Hosting Providers

Proposed Know Your Business Customer (KYBC) rules require hosting providers to verify the legal identity of every business client before service begins. Network operators must validate beneficial owners prior to resource allocation, a process mirroring banking sector due diligence. Collecting corporate registration data and cross-referencing it against Self-governing System Number applications prevents anonymous infrastructure deployment. A critical operational constraint defines the enforcement timeline for live content protection. Rights holders like beIN Sports demand a maximum 30 minutes window to remove pirated live event streams after notification. This compressed timeframe forces hosting companies to automate detection systems rather than rely on manual review processes.

Increased onboarding latency for legitimate startups lacking immediate documentation represents a measurable cost of this approach. Strict KYBC protocols may inadvertently slow down emergency scaling for verified enterprises during traffic spikes while attempting to stop bad actors. Network operators at InterLIR observe that verifying every client creates a significant administrative burden without guaranteed elimination of sophisticated pirates using stolen identities. The shift places the legal burden of content policing directly onto the infrastructure layer.

Application: Deploying BGP Blackholing and Route Filtering for Compliance

Telecom operators possess the BGP blackholing and route filtering tools required to isolate non-compliant network blocks today. The Audiovisual Anti-Piracy Alliance asserts that existing infrastructure can immediately discard traffic from flagged Autonomous System Numbers. Implementation involves configuring border routers to drop packets destined for specific IP prefixes associated with pirate hosting. This technical capability allows providers to de-peer entire networks rather than filtering individual domain names. Applying these blunt instruments creates immediate risks for legitimate tenants sharing the same infrastructure. A single misconfigured filter can disconnect lawful businesses alongside the targeted bad actors. Operators must balance rapid enforcement against the stability of the broader internet routing table. The proposed Know Your Business Customer framework adds a layer of identity verification before resource allocation. This approach shifts liability toward hosting providers who must now validate client identities thoroughly. InterLIR recommends strict prefix filtering policies to minimize collateral damage during compliance operations. Rushing to block an ASN without precise prefix data often leads to widespread service outages. Successful deployment requires distinguishing between malicious intent and shared infrastructure realities.

Validating ASN Blocking Tools Against Pirate Infrastructure

Operators must verify BGP blackholing configurations target specific pirate prefixes without dropping legitimate customer traffic. The Audiovisual Anti-Piracy Alliance confirms telecoms already possess route filtering and de-peering mechanisms used against botnets. These tools act directly on IP routing paths to isolate non-compliant networks. Implementing Know Your Business Customer checks adds a verification layer before resource allocation occurs. Rights holders demand removal of live event streams within 30 minutes of notification. This tight window forces providers to maintain ready-to-deploy filter lists for immediate activation. Broad ASN blocks often capture innocent services sharing the same infrastructure.

InterLIR advises validating every block rule against active customer maps before enforcement. Blindly applying these filters violates the proportionality expected in European compliance frameworks. Loss of revenue from lawful tenants and potential legal challenges constitute the cost of overblocking. Network engineers should test filtering policies in a staging environment to measure impact. Precise prefix matching remains necessary to avoid unnecessary service disruption during enforcement actions.

References

• European internet registry set to exit US hyperscalers -
• APNIC Articles – APNIC: Internet addressing in the 2010s
• Surrounding RPKI are older, gentler defenses. Networks filter what
• Privacy-Focused DNS Providers in 2026: Either is a significant